The Economic and Social Implications of the Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism Act on a Small, Developing Economy by Rambarran, Richard
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
The Economic and Social Implications of
the Anti-Money Laundering and
Countering the Financing of Terrorism
Act on a Small, Developing Economy
Richard Rambarran
University of Hyderabad
15. November 2015
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/68056/
MPRA Paper No. 68056, posted 25. November 2015 06:17 UTC
1 
 
1 
 
The Economic and Social Implications of the Anti-Money Laundering 
and Countering the Financing of Terrorism Act on a Small, Developing 
Economy 
Richard N. Rambarran 
School of Economics, University of Hyderabad 
Abstract: This paper seeks to critically examine the likely economic and social implications of the 
recent amendments to the ‘Anti-Money laundering and countering the Financing of Terrorism 
(Amendment) Act 2015’ (AML-CFTA 2015 Act) on a small, developing, open economy, Guyana. 
This paper examines the amendments to original 2009 Bill and whether this new act, given the 
complexities of the small, developing country, would serve to promote the best economic interest 
of its people who, are at critical juncture of their national development. The paper serves to 
hypothesize and examine not only macroeconomic implications, but also microeconomic 
behaviour, and the implication on the behaviour of agents within society directly and indirectly 
affected by this bill. 
Keywords: Anti-Money laundering, Terrorism, Narco-trafficking, Growth, Crime, Development 
JEL classification: K14, K22, K42, D72, D73 
I. Introduction- The AML-CFTA and succinct historic roots of the institutional 
component (Financial Action Task Force) 
The AML-CFTA is defined as an act to ‘provide for the establishment and management of a 
Financial Intelligence Unit; to provide for unlawful proceeds of all serious offences to be 
identified, traced, frozen, seized and forfeited; to provide for comprehensive powers for the 
prosecution of money laundering, terrorist financing and other financial crimes; and the forfeiture 
of the proceeds of crime and terrorist property; to require reporting entities to take preventative 
measures to help combat money laundering and terrorist financing; to provide for civil forfeiture 
of assets and matters connected herewith.’ (Anti Money Laundering and Countering the Financing 
of Terrorism Act, 2009).  
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The AML-CFTA which has been implemented in Guyana is the brainchild of the Financial Action 
Task Force through the regional body of the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF). 
The Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF), originally conceived in 1989 in 
a G-7 meeting, was a response to growing concerns about money laundering by the members of 
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries. The CFATF is 
the Caribbean basin of countries which was established since two meetings in Aruba and Jamaica 
in 1990s were conducted. In November 1996, a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was 
entered in to by twenty one of the CFATF members. This now serves as the basis of the goals and 
objectives of the CFATF. Of the twenty one members, Guyana was one of those countries. (FATF, 
2014)  
Since the September 11th, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States of America, the development 
of standards to fight against the financing of terrorism were put under the purview of the FATF 
and, has been added to its mission. (FATF, 2015) Since 2012, a set of high-level principles and 
objectives apply to the FATF. They continue to be reinforced via the FATF style regional bodies, 
of which the CFATF is the service member for the Caribbean basin region. It is this ‘high-level 
principles’ which FATF is imposing upon their member countries which saw Guyana’s 2009 
AML-CFTA act being deemed as ‘below par’ and possessing certain loopholes.  
What the succeeding sections will do, is establish possible economic implications of this bill in a 
two-fold manner. An overview will be given of the meritorious aspects of this act will be 
articulated. It will examine the implications on the microeconomic behaviour of agents within the 
economy including the scope for opportunistic behaviour, moral hazard, adverse selection, rent 
seeking and corruption. Additionally, it will examine the possible macroeconomic implications on 
growth and foreign direct investment, exports and property rights infringements.  
The succeeding section will give a succinct overview of pertinent political economy occurrences 
in Guyana and analyze a political impasse within a game theoretical framework, essentially 
narrating the dialectical change of political power and behaviour. This is necessary in 
understanding how political charged the decision of the bill was and the degree of media space 
attributed to the bill.   
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II. Analyzing the political economy of Guyana 
The Anti-Money laundering and countering the Financing of Terrorism Act of 2009 (AML-CFTA) 
and its recent June 2015 amendments have been a ‘contentious bone’ in the Guyanese political 
sphere for a number of years. This bone became especially contentious since threats by the CFATF 
began to surface in mid-2013 (Gurney, 2014). These threats included the blacklisting of Guyana 
as a haven for money laundering and a potential shutting out from the international financial 
system. Despite Guyana enacting legislation since 2009, certain loopholes in the legislation had 
been identified by CFATF in the 2011-2012 period, for which the small South American country 
was given time to rectify. 
An important change in the political landscape in the November 2011 election in Guyana however 
created some issues in the passage of amendments which were not present in the creation of the 
original 2009 AML-CFTA act. In the previous Parliamentary disposition, (i.e. pre-2011 November 
election) the ruling political party, the PPP/C1 had a majority of the seats in the National Assembly 
i.e. 33/65 seats. This ensured that the ruling political party, whose members comprised members 
of the Executive Cabinet of Guyana, were able to push legislation and the necessary amendments 
to legislation through without the being hindered by the opposition within the National Assembly. 
Table 1 represents a simple Payoff Matrix which denotes the outcomes of decisions of the various 
political parties in a government majority national assembly: 
Political Side Minority Combined Opposition [C.O.] (APNU+AFC) 
 
 
Majority 
Government 
(PPP) 
Game Played For2 Against 
 
For  
PPP’s Political Mileage (+) 
C.O.’s Political Mileage (+)3 
Outcome: Bill Passed 
PPP’s Political Mileage (+) 
C.O.’s Political Mileage (-) 
Outcome: Bill Passed 
 
Against 
PPP’s Political Mileage (-) 
C.O.’s Political Mileage (+) 
Outcome: Non-Passage 
PPP’s Political Mileage (-) 
C.O.’s Political Mileage (-) 
Outcome: Non-Passage 
                                                 
1 The People’s Progressive Party/Civic 
2 The green shaded area in table 1 and 2 represent the game which is most commonly played in the political 
structure. 
3 In this situation, the political mileage gained by the combined opposition is less than that of the government party. 
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Table 1-Behaviour of Political Parties in Game where Government has majority in National Assembly (Pre-Nov. 2011) 
The November 2011 elections however created a different Parliamentary dispensation where the 
two main opposition parties4’ total share of seats in Parliament created a ‘majority opposition’ 
whereby, combined, they possessed 33 out of the 65 total possible seats. (Guyana Elections 
Commission (GECOM), 2011). This Parliamentary majority belonging to the combined opposition 
of Guyana allowed the two opposition political parties to hold the government at ‘ransom’ to assent 
to bills which they would have wanted to be passed. Consequentially, one the bills being used as 
leverage, was the AML-CFTA amendment bill which, due to the utilization of the political 
leverage, was never passed. Table 2 denotes the adapted version of Table 1, mapping the Post-
November 2011 election Parliamentary behaviour and likely outcomes: 
Political Side Majority Combined Opposition [C.O.] (APNU+AFC) 
 
 
Minority 
Government 
(PPP) 
Game Played For Against 
 
For  
PPP’s Political Mileage (+) 
C.O.’s Political Mileage (+) 
Outcome: Bill Passed 
PPP’s Political Mileage stagnant 
C.O.’s Political Mileage distorted 
Outcome: Non-Passage 
 
Against 
PPP’s Political Mileage (-) 
C.O.’s Political Mileage (+) 
Outcome: Bill Passed 
PPP’s Political Mileage (-) 
C.O.’s Political Mileage (-) 
Outcome: Non-Passage 
Table 2- Behaviour of Political Parties in a game where Government is a minority (post November 2011 elections) 
The impasse is represented by the green shaded area in table 2. While in table 1, (pre-November 
11th), this would have been clear political mileage increase for the PPP, in this case, the political 
mileage remained relatively stagnant with the potential to decline contingent on the actions and 
manipulations of the combined opposition. The combined opposition held the government at 
‘ransom’ for the bill through utilizing the one seat majority to apply pressure for the President of 
Guyana to assent to certain bills which the combined opposition would have forced through 
Parliament. This quite lucidly did two things: 
i) Pressured the PPP as the executive arm of the government for a response and; 
                                                 
4 The A Partnership for National Unity and, The Alliance for Change 
5 
 
5 
 
ii) Strengthened the support of the combined opposition through continuous reaffirmation 
of the demands. 
Nonetheless, this continuous impasse of legislation between the government of Guyana and the 
combined opposition was a critical factor which led to the then President of Guyana, Donald 
Ramotar, proroguing Parliament on November 10th, 2014 (Stabroek News, 2014) and the eventual 
dissolution of Parliament on February 28th, 2015 (Stabroek News, 2015). As such, the way was 
paved for elections on the 11th May, 2015, for which the two previously disjointed opposition 
parties collated and contested as a unified single party, winning 33 out of the possible 65 seats 
(Guyana Elections Commission (GECOM), 2015). 
This political majority for the now government of Guyana has facilitate the passage of the bill in 
to an amended Act on 25th June, 2015. (Guyana Chronicle, 2015). Table 3 represents the political 
outcome of the current Parliamentary dispensation.  
Political Side Minority Opposition (PPP) 
 
 
Majority 
Government 
(APNU+AFC) 
 
Game Played For Against 
 
For  
Gov’ts Political Mileage (+) 
PPP’s Political Mileage (+)5 
Outcome: Bill Passed 
Gov’ts Political Mileage (+) 
PPP’s Political Mileage (-) 
Outcome: Bill Passed 
 
Against 
Gov’ts Political Mileage (-) 
PPP’s Political Mileage (+) 
Outcome: Non-Passage 
Gov’ts Political Mileage (-) 
PPP’s Political Mileage (-) 
Outcome: Non-Passage 
Table 3- Behaviour of Political Parties in a game where Government is a majority (Previous Opposition in Power) 
With the amended act being passed in the Parliament, an examination of the meritorious aspects 
of this act and the bill passage must be undertaken to determine the benefits to the country. 
III. Merits of the Bill Passage and Specification of the Act 
The merits themselves are to be viewed in a dichotomous manner i.e. the actual passage of the bill 
bears merit for the country, and, the legal specifications of the act bears merit also. The passage of 
the bill will be assessed first. 
                                                 
5 In this situation, the political mileage gained by the combined opposition is less than that of the government party. 
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a) Passage of Bill 
The simple passage of the bill must be viewed as providing benefits for the country. Some 
of the simple benefits are as follows: 
i) Blacklist Removal & Foreign Direct Investment 
Guyana had been, due to the non-passage of the bill, been placed on the 
international ‘blacklist’ of countries which acted as a ‘safe haven’ for money-
laundering and terrorism financing.(Stabroek News, 2014) Being placed on the 
blacklist would have shut Guyana out from international financing and limited the 
quantum of foreign direct investment in the country. With the FATF being a group 
brainchild and controlled by the G7 countries, investments would have firstly dried 
up from these countries. A large portion of Guyana’s foreign investment comes 
from Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States of America, with the USA 
being the largest investor in Guyana. (Export Enterprises, 2015). There is also a 
strong correlation between the growth of the Gross Domestic Product and the 
growth of Foreign Direct Investment as depicted in Figure 1 below: 
Source: Author’s elaboration of data from World Bank 
 
Figure 1- Correlation between Foreign Direct Investment and GDP in Guyana since 2000 
Should there be a mass contraction in foreign direct investment in Guyana, there 
surely would be a contraction in the rate of GDP expansion. 
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Delay in the passage of this bill however began affect the foreign direct investment, 
as a report by (US Department of State, 2014) explicitly stated, 
‘Guyana’s investment climate took a downward turn in 2013 as political gridlock 
and infighting hampered the country’s development efforts on several fronts. The 
Amaila Falls Hydropower Project, which would have been the largest capital 
project in the country’s history, fell apart after a decade of planning when U.S. 
developer and equity partner Sithe Global withdrew from the multinational 
development team in August 2013. The company had concerns related to political 
risk following objections to the venture by the country’s largest opposition party. 
Guyana’s failure to crack down on money laundering — including parliament’s 
inability to pass legislation strengthening Anti-Money Laundering/Countering 
the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) laws — has resulted in the country being 
blacklisted by the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF). Further 
action by the international Financial Action Task Force could result in increased 
costs and delays in processing international financial and trade transactions’ 
This explicit decline in foreign direct investment is seen in figure 2 below: 
Source: Author’s elaboration of data from World Bank 
 
Figure 2- Foreign Direct Investment in Guyana 
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Figure 2 depicts the decline in foreign direct investment decline which occurred in 
the 2012 year. Had this bill not been passed, a secular deterioration would have 
begun to occur in foreign direct investment, as the polynomial forecast in figure 2 
depicts. 
ii) Maintenance of, and the Strengthening of Political Relations 
The passage of the bill ensured that Guyana maintained and, strengthened their 
political relations by depicting a commitment on the country’s part to fight against 
the threat of terrorism and money laundering. Guyana, by being blacklisted, joined 
the categorization of countries such as Yemen, North Korea, Myanmar and other 
countries plagued with terror and corruption, on an official basis. (FATF, 2014) 
This type of categorization would have hindered Guyana’s stable political relations 
with OECD countries such as the United States of America and the United 
Kingdom, possibly even resulting in diplomatic termination.  
iii) Country’s ‘Narco-State’ Image 
According to many authors who have written on Narco-development (Singer, 
2008), (Figueira, 2012) et. al., Guyana is labeled as a ‘narco-state.’ As (Kirton & 
Anatol, 2014) note, the contemporary context of Guyana is classified by ‘drug 
trafficking’ and ‘money laundering’ which, has resulted in regional and 
international cooperative efforts to battle drug trafficking since the end of the Cold 
War.  
The passage of this bill identifies a willingness on the part of Guyana, to battle the 
‘narco-state’ image which arises. As the (US Department of State, 2014) reports, 
‘Money laundering is perceived as a serious problem, and has been linked to drug 
trafficking (principally cocaine), firearms, corruption, and fraud, as well as to the 
influx of foreign currency.’ The report continues with a call of the state to pass the 
AML-CFAT bill, for which, the current passage and enactment goes some measure 
in reducing the country’s condoning of narco-development and other illegal types 
of activities.   
b) Specification of the Act 
The specification of the act itself also is meritorious in several instances, where the 
amendment serves to strengthen the effectiveness of the bill. The instances of legal 
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specifications to influence the behaviour of the agents involved is key in assuring optimal 
social outcomes. Those specifications are listed below: 
i) The usage of strict non-liability 
Section 11 of the (Anti Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of 
Terrorism Act, 2009) speaks to ‘no criminal or civil liability for information’ 
disclosure. It reads, 
1. ‘No proceedings for breach of professional confidentiality may be instituted 
against any person or against directors, officer or employees of a reporting 
entity, who in good faith transmits or submits suspicious transactions or 
suspicious activity reports to the Financial Intelligence Unit in accordance with 
this Act. 
2. No civil or criminal liability action may be brought nor may any professional 
sanction be taken against any person or agent of any reporting entity for breach 
of any restriction on disclosure, who, in good faith transmits information or 
submits reports to the Financial Intelligence Unit.’  
The application of strict non-liability is key in incentivizing behaviour of agents 
who might suspect money laundering activities being conducted by an individual 
or group of individual. In a country like Guyana, where, according to (Kirton & 
Anatol, 2014), the impact of the drug trafficking world and the underground 
economy is ‘felt in every aspect of social life,’ it is important to assure informants 
that they will in no way be somehow connected with the activity or they will be 
criminally liable. 
The amendment to the bill served to further strengthen the act by adding,  
‘even if the person, director, officer or employee did not know precisely what the 
underlying criminal activity was, and regardless of whether the illegal activity 
actually occurred.’ 
which serves to further add specificity to the legislature.  
ii)  The use of strict confidentiality 
As a corollary to the point made above on (Kirton & Anatol, 2014), strict 
confidentiality by the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) is of utmost importance in 
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incentivizing informants to come forward. Specifically engendered in the statute is 
the clause of strict confidentiality. Section 12 of the Act reads, 
1. ‘Any person who obtains information in any form as a result of his connection 
with the Financial Intelligence Unit shall not disclose that information to any 
person except so far as it is required or permitted under this Act or written law. 
2. Any person who willfully discloses information to any person in contravention 
of subjection (1) shall be subject to dismissal from the Financial Intelligence 
Unit and is liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding two million 
dollars and to imprisonment for a term not exceeding four years.’ 
While this section of the act is meritorious, the amount of fine should not be 
specified nor should the imprisonment term, as this should be contingent on the 
nature of the offense. For example, in a high profile case of a major drug trafficker, 
someone who is offering information to the FIU, is risking their freedom and very 
possibly their life given how intertwined the drug trade is in Guyana and how 
rampant agents of the criminal underworld are in varying elements of life. Should 
an officer of the FIU disclose a large volume of information which can possibly 
result in the execution of an informant, the court should be able to impose a penalty 
which is much higher, to the discretion of the judge. Likewise, there should be a 
minimum amount of imprisonment and fine which an FIU officer should face. As 
such, the lower boundary or minimum attributes of the punishment should be set 
with an unlimited upper boundary or, no cap being set on prison time or fines.  
iii) Compensation clause 
For persons who are found to have obtained property by a means not directly or 
indirectly related to crime and, have been investigated, are able to be compensated 
by the state. The section of the Act, section 84, is extensive, but one segment is 
worth noting: 
‘The Court may, on application to it in that behalf by a person who shows to the 
satisfaction of the Court that: 
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The property does not constitute, directly or indirectly, proceeds of crime or was 
not acquired, in a whole or in part, with or in connection with property that, directly 
or indirectly, constitutes proceeds of crime, 
Award to the person if any such compensation payable by the Minister as it 
considers just in the circumstances in respect of any loss incurred by the person by 
reason of the order concerned.’ 
With compensation being included, an aggrieved party may be financially 
compensated. There are however essential problems which underpin compensation 
in this case.  
One of the major ones being the defamation which occurs as a result of being 
investigated for money laundering. Even if one is proven to be innocent by the court 
of law, this does not automatically acquit someone of the stigma which can be 
attached to being investigated for a crime such as money laundering and its obvious 
underpinning of criminal acts. For example, an entrepreneur may find his business 
facing declining sales as the public seeks to avert support of his entity or a worker 
may face some stigma from his employer or fellow employees.  
A public statement by the courts should also be issued such that the harm and 
disrepute which is meted out to the individual’s character can be, in some sense, 
alleviated. This would certainly go a long way in ensuring some degree of 
compensation which extends beyond the pecuniary. This is especially true in 
instances where markets do not exist for the said attribute and as such, the price 
cannot be determined; in this case, there is no clearly determinable price which 
exists for an individual’s reputation. 
 
IV.  Possible Existential Detriments attributed to the AML-CFAT Bill 
In the preceding sections, the AML-CFAT bill was lauded on the merits which it 
brought to Guyanese. Invoking the Law of Unintended Consequences (Merton, 1936), 
there may be unexpected drawbacks which may occur. In (Merton, 1936) analysis, 
unexpected drawbacks are negative and unexpected drawbacks which occur 
simultaneously to the desired effect of the policy or action. It is these unexpected 
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drawbacks which do not appear ‘prima facie’ and requires a greater degree of 
investigation to understanding the underlying logic. 
In Guyana, there is a faint passive recognition of expected drawbacks of the AML-
CFAT bill as was evidenced by a statement from the Minister of Legal Affairs and 
Attorney General Mr. Basil Williams. (Guyana Information News Agency (GINA), 
2015). It was articulated by the Attorney General that, ‘whimsical seizures’ will not be 
tolerated and only transactions above USD$50,000 will be investigated. He 
unknowingly (or knowingly but passively) recognized the unexpected drawbacks. 
For the AML-CFAT bill, there are three broad thematics under which these unexpected 
drawbacks may be analyzed under: 
i) Cash-Based Society 
Guyana’s economy is highly cash based. A simple ratio of the currency in 
circulation to the total capital would depict a continuous growth in the currency 
in circulation relative to the total capital in Guyana. Table 4 below depicts the 
quantum of currency in circulation and capital quantity, of which a ratio of the 
capital/currency in circulation will be expressed. 
Source: Bank of Guyana Annual Report Compilation 
Year 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Currency in 
Circulation ($B) 
42.1 50.48 61.6 68.0 67.4 
Capital ($B) 214.86 240.42 240.56 259.48 234.68 
Capital/Currency 5.10 4.76 3.91 3.82 3.48 
Table 4- Capital/Currency in Circulation Ratio 
The ratio in Table 4 above would show a secular deterioration in the capital to 
currency in circulation ratio which makes pellucid the point that, over time, 
Guyana becomes even more cash based. 
With this point in consideration, there are some considerations which must be 
made in regards to the AML-CFAT bill. There are several individuals who 
conduct businesses in Guyana on a cash basis which require a large quantum of 
cash in hand at the point of transaction, and in their possession. These include 
farmers, gold miners, landlords and night club owners. Activities which these 
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varying professions undertake may be misconstrued to be money laundering. 
With the continuous increase in gold production as well as the precious metal 
being a major export earner, along with the agricultural sector this can pose 
some issues for farmers and miners, as they may be excessively targeted or 
burdened, affecting efficiency.  
ii) Red Tape-ism and Investors 
Guyana ranks, in 2015, 123rd out of 189 countries on the Ease of Doing 
Business Index. The formalities associated with the AML-CFAT Act act as a 
deterrent to both foreign and domestic investors as there are a number of 
formalities associated with complying with the AML-CFAT Act. This may tend 
to further hinder investment rates. 
Most interesting is, Guyana ranks 167th out of 189 countries on the list of 
‘getting credit’ (Ease of Doing Business , 2015). Further paperwork issued by 
the Bank of Guyana, to comply with an international framework will put 
enormous strain on an already stifled credit market.  
Banks are given a ‘due care’ level which must be taken, implying the usage of 
a negligence rule, as imposed by the AML-CFAT Act. This means that: 
 
x*- optimal care set by the CFAT Act 
xb- bank care 
c(x)- cost of care to bank     c`(x)>0; c``(x)=0 
p=p(x)- inverse function of care    p`(x)<0 
E(D)=p(x)D 
S.C.- Social Cost:  
S.C.(X)=p(x)D+c(x)      1.  
X*≤Xb        2. 
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Figure 3- Increasing Costs with Bank Care 
The increased care which is taken by the bank, i.e. Xb≥X* clearly increases both 
the imputed cost of delivering the banking service, and the social cost, which 
can be explained as the cost of losing investment deterred by the red tape-ism 
which exists as a result. 
This will be a result of the bank trying to reduce the risk of the expected 
damaging activity (money laundering) occurring, especially since they will be 
held for negligence if they fail to take their due level of care X* 
iii) Moral hazard, opportunistic behaviour, corruption and rent-seeking  
Given the fact that there is some amount enforcement which is to be undertaken 
by the FIU, the Guyana Police Force (GPF) will need to be the body which 
enforces the legislature. Immediately, the possibility of moral hazard arises 
where the agent (the FUI) and the principal (the GPF), do not have views which 
act tangentially to each other. As such, opportunistic behaviour may tend to take 
over and the classic case of the Principal-Agent problem arises. 
Further, opportunities for rent-seeking and corruption arise, which may tend to 
increase the already rampant nature of corruption in Guyana.  
 
 
X X
* 
C(x) 
P(x)D 
P(x)D 
S.C 
Xb 
Source: Author's Depiction 
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V. Conclusion and Recommendation 
The AML-CFAT bill is one which, due to international political pressure needed to be 
passed in Guyana. The situation was, and remains one where the net benefit of the 
passage of the bill is a positive. As has been highlighted throughout this paper however, 
even the meritorious aspects of the bill have points upon which improvements can be 
made. The demerits of the Act identified, while possible, did not, and still do not 
represent a threat as great as those posed in the counterfactual event of the non-passage 
of the bill as demonstrated in Section III(a).  
Nonetheless, despite the passage and enactment of the Bill being important, the 
shortfalls highlighted must not be overlooked as they can work towards making the Act 
an improved and more facilitating document in the development of the small, 
developing economy. Some specific legislative and policy recommendations arising 
from the examination in this paper are: 
i) Removal of maximum cap on punishment of members of the FIU leaking 
information 
ii) Publishing of public statement by courts as a means of non-pecuniary 
compensation 
iii) Orientation of the Guyanese society, especially those groups at high risk of 
being targeted identified in Section IV (i), towards a less cash based economy. 
This can involve incentivizing the use of non-cash methods of transactions by 
the government. 
iv) Monitoring the degree of care that commercial banks take so as to ensure that 
social costs and imputed costs of operations do not become excessively high. 
v) The use of a foreign unit of enforcement or a specific branch of the Guyana 
Police Force should be utilized so as to minimize the mishap of rent-seeking or 
a corrupt body of officers in the Guyana Police Force potentially damaging 
years of work, hours of manpower and millions of dollars. 
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